In this paper we explore the proposition that in economies with imperfect competitive markets the optimal capital income tax is negative and the optimal tax on …rms pro…ts is con…scatory. We show that if the total factor productivity as well as the measure of …rms or varieties are endogenous instead of …xed, then the optimal …scal policy can lead to di¤erent results. The government faces a trade-o¤ between the …xed costs that society pays for the introduction of a new …rm and the productivity gains associated to the introduction of a new variety. We …nd that the optimal …scal policy depends on the relationship between the index of market power, the returns to specialization, and the government's ability to control entry.
Introduction
The empirical evidence shows that any source of capital income, pro…t or rent, is taxed in most of the OECD countries. This fact has generated an important theoretical discussion in order to …nd the sign and the magnitude of the optimal capital income tax. According to Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) , in an economy with competitive markets and in…nitely-lived consumers, the steady-state optimal capital income tax should be zero 1 . More recently Judd (1997 Judd ( , 2002 has challenged the importance of the competitive markets assumption. Using a model with monopolistic competition and a …xed number of …rms, he …nds that the optimal …scal policy prescribes a negative capital income tax and a con…scatory tax rate on …rms pro…ts 2 . One potential problem of implementing investment subsidies is that in an environment with free entry such subsidies could lead to excessive entry and reduce aggregate e¢ ciency. Consequently, the optimal tax should take into account the possibility that investment subsidies could lead to a socially ine¢ cient number of …rms.
In this paper we construct a model with monopolistic competition and free entry where the introduction of new varieties increases the productivity of the economy. We examine the connection between the optimal tax policy and the incentives for new …rms to enter the market.
The main contribution of the paper is to show that once we consider an endogenous number of …rms, the optimal …scal policy can lead to di¤erent results. In contrast to Judd (1997 Judd ( , 2002 , the introduction of free entry eliminates pure pro…ts in equilibrium 3 . The government then faces a trade-o¤ between the …xed costs that society pays for the introduction of a new …rm and the aggregate gains associated with entry. The resolution of this trade-o¤ and the properties of the optimal …scal policy hinge on the government capacity to control …rms'entry-exit decisions and to induce the optimal number of …rms in the market 4 . We identify some additional sources and 1 Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) have challenged the perfect information assumption. In an environment with private information, they show that the capital income tax can be positive once the informational constraints are considered by the government. 2 The basic intuition works as follows. Since the market price exceeds the marginal cost, the government uses a capital subsidy to counterbalance the market power and thus the e¢ cient capital-labor ratio is recovered. Moreover, given that pro…ts do not a¤ect any agent's decision at the margin, the government …nds it optimal to tax them at a con…scatory rate. According to Judd (1997) , the estimates of welfare gains associated to implementing the optimal capital income tax can be misleading since the prescribed policy implies an investment subsidy other than zero.
3 In a related paper, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) show that if the government has no access to a 100% tax rate on monopoly pro…ts, then the Friedman rule is not optimal and the government resorts to a positive nominal interest rate as an indirect way to tax pro…ts. Recently, Mankiw and Weinzierl (2004) show that the presence of market power and monopoly pro…ts are relevant to analyzing the revenue e¤ects of changes in the capital income tax rate. In particular, they show that monopoly pro…ts can raise the ability of a capital income tax cut to be self-…nancing. 4 Guo and Lansing (1999) introduce depreciation allowances and endogenous government expenditure in Judd's (1997) imperfect competition model. They show that if the government can fully con…scate pro…ts, then the steady-state capital income tax is negative. However, in the case that the tax authority cannot di¤erentiate between capital income and pro…ts, they …nd that the optimal corporate tax in steady state can be negative, positive, or zero, depending on the degree of monopoly power, the size of the depreciation allowances, and the magnitude of the government expenditure.
parameters, in particular an index of market power and an index of returns to specialization, that a¤ect the sign of both the capital income tax and the tax on …rms'pro…ts 5 .
A second contribution of the paper is to show that the modeling of the monopolistic competition framework is not innocuous. Our formulation departs from the seminal work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , since we consider the formulation proposed by Ethier (1982) and Benassy (1998) that separates the returns to specialization (or returns to variety, as in Kim, 2004 ) from the monopolistic mark-up. This formulation has two advantages. First, the set-up embeds the standard monopolistic competition with a …xed number of …rms as a special case. Second, it allows us to characterize the optimal tax policy as function of the market power and returns to specialization. We show that separating these two parameters is crucial in order to avoid misleading results.
In this economy the presence of imperfect competition combined with free entry introduces two sources of market ine¢ ciency. The …rst ine¢ ciency is the price-marginal cost distortion or mark-up distortion: the monopoly power in the intermediate goods sector introduces a wedge between the price and the marginal productivity of each input. The presence of free entry generates a second ine¢ ciency: the market equilibrium can generate an ine¢ cient number of …rms. When a …rm decides to enter the market, it only considers the private net bene…t from entry, but it ignores the social net bene…t generated by its entry. Consequently, the private bene…t from entry (monopoly pro…ts) can be di¤erent than the social bene…t. At the aggregate level, the introduction of a new …rm is determined by two opposite e¤ects: a complementary e¤ect and a business-stealing e¤ect. The complementary e¤ect tends to generate an ine¢ ciently low number of …rms, since …rms do not take into account the positive e¤ect on total productivity when they enter the market. The business-stealing e¤ect tends to produce excessive entry of …rms, since new …rms enter the market attracted by high pro…ts but they do not take into account the negative impact of their entry on the incumbent …rms' demand. Consequently, if government does not control entry, market outcomes could generate a number of …rms too low (high) relative to the social optimum when monopoly pro…ts are too low (high).
The scope of the paper is to study the optimal distortionary tax policy. However, the analysis of the social optimum is useful to illustrate the di¤erent ine¢ ciencies arising from monopolistic competition. A social planner ensures that the private return and the social return coincide allowing for the distortion associated with the monopoly power to be e¤ectively eliminated through the correspondent investment subsidy. An additional instrument is still required to determine the e¢ cient number of …rms. We call this instrument pro…ts tax, and its optimal value can be positive, negative or zero.
The optimal tax policy depends on the tax authority's capacity to control entry. We consider three di¤erent cases. In the …rst case, the government has access to a complete set of …scal instruments and, therefore, can directly control entry through the pro…ts tax. We show that this tax is equivalent to have di¤erent tax allowances for …xed and variable costs. We …nd that the optimal capital income tax only depends on the degree of market power or markup, and it is always negative, as in Judd (1997 Judd ( , 2002 . By implementing a capital subsidy, the government removes mark-up distortion in capital accumulation. In addition, the optimal pro…ts tax/subsidy depends on the relationship between the mark-up and the returns to specialization, and it coincides with the social planner tax/subsidy. Neither the capital subsidy nor the pro…ts tax/subsidy depend on the burden of taxation. Hence, it is labor that bears the tax burden.
In the second case, we assume that the government is restricted to set equal tax allowances for …xed and variable costs. With this tax code restriction, the equilibrium number of …rms cannot be a¤ected by the …scal authority. In this scenario, the number of …rms is pinned down by the zero pro…t condition in the market equilibrium, which is taken as a constraint by the government. Therefore, the pro…ts tax is irrelevant, since …rms can expense all their costs and make zero pro…ts. In contrast with the previous case, we …nd that the optimal capital income tax does not depend on the magnitude of the mark-up, but it does depend on the returns to specialization. Surprisingly, we show that in the absence of aggregate returns to specialization the optimal steady-state capital income tax is zero. The threat of endogenous entry leads to a prescribed capital income tax of zero instead of a subsidy. This …nding is consistent with some theoretical results in the industrial organization literature (see Benassy,1998; de Groot and Nahuis ,1998; or Jones and Williams 2000) , which show that when returns to specialization are not present, a tax or a subsidy leads to a socially ine¢ cient number of …rms 6 .
In the third case, we assume that the government cannot di¤erentiate monopoly pro…ts from capital income and, as a result, both are taxed at the same rate. Hence, the government levies a corporate tax on any source of income generated by …rms. While Guo and Lansing (1999) consider the optimal corporate tax in an economy without entry and this corporate tax is used by the government as an indirect way to tax the monopoly pro…ts, in our formulation the government can indirectly control …rms'entry through corporate taxation. We …nd that the optimal corporate tax depends not only on the magnitude of the returns to specialization and the mark-up, but also on the curvature degree of the production function.
Finally, as a robustness excercise, we show that the previous …ndings remain unchanged in a model with di¤erentiated consumption and investment goods. We …nd that the introduction of di¤erent degrees of returns to specialization in the consumption and investment goods does not change the main driving forces. However, capital depreciation a¤ects the optimal …scal policy since optimal investment decisions have to take into account not only the investment aggregate returns to specialization, but also the steady-state invesment. 6 Auerbach and Hines (2002) consider a static oligopoly model in order to compare the optimality of ad valorem and speci…c commodity taxes. They study how the government could use commodity taxation to reduce the market power distortion. But in the case of free entry they show that a government tax aiming to reduce the market power distortion could lead to an ine¢ cient entry of …rms .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the basic framework and derive the market equilibrium. In section 3 we compare the market allocation with the social optimum in order to identify the main ine¢ ciency sources. This comparison is useful to understand the trade-o¤s that the government faces when choosing the optimal policy.
In section 4 we analyze the optimal …scal policy depending on the tax code or …scal instruments available to the government. Section 5 concludes.
Market equilibrium
We consider an in…nite-horizon production economy with imperfectly competitive product markets. There is a composite …nal good Y; which is at the same time a consumption and investment good. Also, the government …nances an exogenous stream of purchases of the …nal good by levying distortionary taxes. The …nal good is produced by competitive …rms using the following technology (as in Ethier, 1982; Benassy, 1996; Kim, 2004) 7 :
where the inputs are a continuum of intermediate goods Ethier (1982) and Benassy (1996) . Since there is free entry in the intermediate goods sector, the number of varieties z is determined by the zero pro…t condition. In a symmetric equilibrium, all …rms in the intermediate goods sector produce the same output level x and, thus, aggregate output is Y = z v+1 x: Therefore, an expansion in the number of intermediate inputs raises the …nal production. Thus, the elasticity of output with respect to the number of …rms z is given by the "degree of returns to specialization" v. This parameter measures the degree to which society bene…ts from spreading production among a large number of intermediate goods: As a result, an increase in the variety of inputs improves the total factor productivity of the …nal good technology. This formulation allows us to separate the consequences of the mark-up from the returns to specialization for the design of the optimal tax policy.
In order to obtain the inverse demand function for each intermediate input, we solve the 7 The time subscripts on the production side of the economy have been eliminated to keep notation simple. 8 An exposition of a simple static macromodel with monopolistic competition can be found in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) . Also, Rotermberg and Woodford (1995) and Schmitt-Grohé (1997) present di¤erent dynamic macromodels with monopolistic competition. pro…t maximization problem of the competitive …rm producing the …nal good, which is given by
where p i is the price of the ith intermediate good and P is the price of the …nal output, and we obtain
In the intermediate sector, each …rm produces one intermediate input for which it has market power. In order to operate, …rms have to pay a …xed cost P (measured in units of the …nal good) 9 . Firms produce the intermediate good according to a constant returns to scale production function,
where k i and l i denote capital and labor input, respectively, for …rm i. The technology is assumed to be strictly concave, C 2 ; and satis…es the Inada conditions. The pro…t function of …rm i depends on the tax treatment of corporate pro…ts. We assume that …rms pay taxes on variable pro…ts at a rate vp and receive tax subsidies or depreciation allowances to their operating costs at a rate s10,11 . Each …rm solves 12
subject to the …nal goods sector demand and the production function given by Eq. (3) and Eq. (4), respectively. r is the rental price of capital and w is the wage rate. This general formulation assumes that the tax authority can distinguish both variable costs and …xed costs, since di¤erent business costs can be expensed at di¤erent rates. However, if the tax authority cannot distinguish the two types of cost, then it follows that vp = s : We analyze this case in detail later. Since …rms have monopoly power, they …x the price above the marginal cost and the mark-up is determined by the elasticity of demand : The associated …rst-order conditions of the …rm problem yield
9 The …xed cost is independent of the quantity produced, as in Matsuyama (1995) and Wu and Zhang (2000) . Examples are …xed maintenance costs, managerial costs, or operational costs.
1 0 There is no reason why the tax authority should choose di¤erent tax allowances for variable and …xed costs. However, writing the problem in this general form allows us to study the implications of these di¤erent instruments.
1 1 Since pro…ts in both the …nal and the intermediate sector are zero in equilibrium, we have omitted a tax on dividends. Also, we have supressed the pro…ts tax from the …nal goods …rms problem since it has no e¤ect on the …rms decisions. 1 2 There are two possible ways to formulate the investment decisions in the economy. The …rst, which we have assumed, is that households own the capital and …rms rent the capital to them. Alternatively, we could assume that capital belongs to the …rms and individuals own the …rms. Given that capital markets are perfect, both frameworks generate the same equilibrium outcome; see McGrattan and Prescott (2000) .
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where all …rms produce the same output level x i = x with the same quantity of inputs, k i = k and l i = l; set the same price p i = p; and have the same gross pro…ts i = . The aggregate stock of capital is K = zk and the aggregate employment is L = zl. Thus, in equilibrium, using Eq.(6) and Eq. (7), we can write the return of capital and the wage rate as a function of total employment and capital 13 ,
It is worth noting that the mark-up introduces a wedge between the price of the factors and the value of the marginal productivity, which implies that capital and labor are paid below the value of their marginal productivity. Moreover, at the symmetric equilibrium, the …nal output is equal to
and the price, by substituting Eq. (4) and Eq. (10) into Eq. (3), is
In each period, new intermediate good producers may enter and produce a new variety. The free-entry condition on gross pro…ts (each intermediate …rm makes zero after-tax pro…ts, i.e.
= 0) determines the equilibrium number of …rms. Formally,
Since the …nal cost is de…ned in terms of the …nal output, the entry of any …rm reduces the relative price between …nal output and intermediate goods P=p = z v ; and thus it makes entry more pro…table. However, individual …rms do not internalize this e¤ect. From Eq. (11) and Eq. (12), we obtain the total number of …rms as a function of capital stock, employment and tax policy,
where we have replaced vp and s by a tax on pro…ts de…ned as (1
This tax allows the government to control entry. Note that with equal tax allowances for variable and …xed costs, vp = s ; the pro…ts tax is zero and the government cannot control entry.
Finally, we consider the …nal good as the numéraire and normalize its price to one, P = 1:
Hence, the relative price of the intermediate goods becomes p = z v : Thus, we can express the rate of return of capital and the wages in the following way:
In our model, the entry of new …rms can be interpreted as R&D in the production of new inputs which increases the total productivity of the economy as in the endogenous growth literature.
An expansion in the number of intermediate inputs increases the production of the …nal good, see Eq. (10). At the same time, the return of capital and wage rise. However, our speci…cation of the …nal goods production function, based on Benassy (1996) , di¤ers from the conventional formulation established by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , which is generally assumed in most of the endogenous growth (e.g., Romer, 1996) and international trade literatures. In our model, the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) formulation corresponds to the case where v = = (1 ) < 1:
Thus, there exists a one-to-one relationship between the market power and the degree of returns to specialization. While Benassy (1996) shows that the market equilibrium can generate too much innovation or entry (the number of intermediate goods z is higher than in the social optimum equilibrium), resources devoted to R&D are ine¢ ciently low in the models based on the conventional formulation, as in Romer (1996) . In our formulation, we can have two possible situations: in the …rst case the government has to subsidize the entry of new …rms in order to foster innovation, whereas in the second case the government has to restrict the entry of new …rms since this represents a social waste of resources. If the government cannot distinguish between …xed and variable costs, or both costs can be expensed at the same rate, then the tax authority does not have a direct instrument to control the number of …rms and its size. Entry can only be indirectly controlled through the optimal capital-labor ratio at the plant level. Thus, the conventional formulation, v = =(1 ); o¤ers an useful benchmark to explain our results.
Note that the model used by Judd (1997) , where aggregate returns to specialization are absent, corresponds to the particular case of v = 0, = 0; and the total number of …rms is …xed and normalized to one, z = 1. Then, from Eq. (11), p = P:
We consider a representative consumer that each period chooses consumption c t ; the allocation of savings between investment in capital K t or government bonds D t ; and the allocation of their one unit of time endowment between work L t ; and leisure (1 L t ). We assume there is no population growth. Formally, the consumers solve
where k t and l t are the taxes on capital income and labor, respectively, T c t is a lump-sum tax/transfer and t denotes aggregate pro…ts net of taxes. However, we know that in equilibrium t = 0. Note that the government debt and capital have to o¤er the same rate of return, 1 + r t (1 k t ); where is the depreciation rate. The utility function U is strictly concave, C 2 ; and satis…es the usual Inada conditions. We assume that B is a large positive constant that prevents Ponzi schemes. The solution to the consumer problem yields the standard …rst-order
together with a transversality condition for capital and government debt. The goods market clearing condition is
where G t denotes the period government expenditure. Combining the consumer budget constraint with the aggregate resource constraint and the free-entry condition, we can derive the government budget constraint. Next, we de…ne the notion of market equilibrium of the described economy.
De…nition 1 (Market equilibrium): Given a …scal policy f t ; l t ; k t+1 ; T c t g 1 t=0 , government expenditure fG t g 1 t=0 ; and the initial conditions K 0 and D 0 ; a market equilibrium is a set of plans y = fc t ; L t ; K t+1 ; z t g 1 t=0 satisfying 1) the household problem, 2) the …rm problem in both sectors, 3) the market clearing conditions, and 4) the government budget constraint.
The following conditions are satis…ed in the market equilibrium:
together with the free-entry condition Eq.(13) and the resource constraint Eq.(20). In the presence of lump-sum taxes and transfers, it is well-known that the government can achieve
Pareto e¢ cient allocations. The scope of this paper is to study the optimal …scal policy when these transfers are not available. However, the analysis of the social optimum is useful to illustrate the trade-o¤s that the government faces when the optimal tax policy is designed, and it shows the di¤erent ine¢ ciencies introduced by the monopolistic competition sector.
Social optimum
Next, we show that the market allocation is not Pareto e¢ cient. We can asses Pareto optimality by comparing the market allocation and the social or unconstrained optimum. The social planner can control the number of …rms in the intermediate goods sector. Thus, the planner faces a trade-o¤ between the …xed costs that society pays for the introduction of a new …rm and the productivity gains associated with the introduction of a new variety. We assume that the social planner takes as given the sequence of public expenditure fG t g 1 t=0 and the initial level of the capital stock K 0 . For a symmetric allocation across intermediate goods, the social planner solves:
and the usual non-negativity constraints c t 0 and L t 2 [0; 1]: The associated …rst-order
together with a transversality condition for the capital, and the resource constraint. Eq. (25) reveals that an increase in total production vz
resulting from a unit increase in z t must be equal to the entry cost : This simply states that at the social optimum the marginal social bene…t of a new intermediate input must equal its marginal social cost. Note that the assumption v 2 [0; 1) implies that the marginal bene…t of a new input declines with the number of inputs, therefore, the social optimum is well-de…ned 14 . Rearranging Eq. (25), we express the socially e¢ cient number of …rms as a function of the aggregate returns to specialization parameter, …xed cost, capital stock and employment,
Note that when v = 0 we have a corner solution, since the entry of a new …rm does not increase the productivity of the …nal goods sector but duplicates the …xed cost. Therefore, it is socially e¢ cient to only allow one (normalized) …rm, z t = 1.
Next, we use the social planner's solution to asses the e¢ ciency of the market allocation.
First, we analyze the mark-up or price-marginal cost distortion. Inspection of Eq. (21) and Eq.(23) reveals that the monopoly power in the intermediate goods sector reduces the wage below the marginal productivity of labor. The market power introduces a distortion in the household labor/consumption decision, such that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor is lower than the marginal productivity of labor. We have the same distortion in the intertemporal household decision, as Eq. (22) and Eq. (24) show. The marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption, U ct = U c t+1 , is lower than the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation 1
However, this markup distortion does not depend on the number of …rms in the market. The social planner can attain Pareto e¢ cient allocations by implementing
These two subsidies only depend on the mark-up magnitude, and they ensure that the private and the social returns coincide. Then, and as in Judd (1997) , the distortion on capital accumulation generated by the monopoly power is e¤ectively eliminated.
There exists a second distortion, since the market equilibrium can generate an ine¢ cient level of …rms. When a …rm has to decide to enter the market it only considers if monopoly pro…ts are higher than the …xed cost, but it ignores the productivity gains generated by the introduction of a new intermediate good. Hence, the private bene…ts from entry (monopoly pro…ts) can be di¤erent from the social bene…ts (productivity increase). In contrast with the social planner's choice in Eq.(26), the market allocation for z t in Eq.(13) depends on instead of v: The entry of a new …rm in the market is determined by two opposite e¤ects, a complementary e¤ect and a business-stealing e¤ect. The complementary e¤ect arises from the fact that a new …rm in the market raises the demand by increasing the productivity in the …nal goods sector.
Then, since pro…ts increase relative to the …xed cost, entry becomes more pro…table. This e¤ect tends to generate an ine¢ ciently low number of …rms, given that …rms do not take into account the positive e¤ect of entry on aggregate productivity. The business-stealing e¤ect results from the fact that the existing …rms in the market have to share the demand with the new …rm, although this new …rm produces a di¤erentiated product and it does not compete directly with the incumbent …rms. Therefore, individual pro…ts decline with the number of …rms. This e¤ect tends to produce excessive entry of …rms, since new …rms enter the market attracted by high pro…ts but they do not take into account the negative e¤ect on the incumbent …rms. Overall, the market can generate a number of …rms too low (high) relative to the social optimum when monopoly pro…ts are too low (high). Therefore, by comparing Eq.(13) and Eq.(26), the Pareto e¢ cient allocation implies setting 15,16
The pro…ts tax can be positive, negative or zero, depending on the relationship between the mark-up and the returns to specialization. When these returns are strong enough, entry is insu¢ cient and it is better to subsidize pro…ts, since the increase in the aggregate productivity due to a new …rm o¤sets the social cost. When the returns to specialization are low enough, there is excessive entry and a positive pro…ts tax is optimal. Note that the market equilibrium number of …rms is only e¢ cient when the complementary e¤ect and the business-stealing e¤ect coincide, v = :
Two cases deserve special attention. First, in the absence of aggregate returns to special-
In this case …rms will try to enter the market to capture monopoly pro…ts, but from a social point of view, the entry of new …rms is a waste of resources. Therefore, the social planner con…scates all the monopoly pro…ts to prevent entry of new …rms. Second, in the conventional formulation, v = = (1 ) ; the market always generates an insu¢ cient number of …rms. Hence the social planner needs to introduce a subsidy t = =(1 ), which is identical to the capital and labor subsidies, Eq.(27). However, this result could be misleading since the subsidy to entry is not only determined by the mark-up, since in this case measures both market power and returns to specialization.
By comparing the social optimum with the market allocation, we clearly identify two market failures or distortions. First, the mark-up or price-marginal cost distortion implies that capital and labor are paid below their marginal productivity. Therefore, we have a distortion in both the household labor/consumption and intertemporal decisions. If lump-sum taxes were available, it would be possible to eliminate this distortion with the capital and labor subsidies described in Eq.(27). The second market failure or distortion is the ine¢ cient entry. In the market equilibrium, the number of …rms is determined by monopoly pro…ts. However, the social optimum is determined by the productivity growth generated by the introduction of a new intermediate 1 6 In fact, it is not so important that the government can di¤erentiate tax allowances between …xed and variable costs. As an example, the government could also implement the optimal level of varieties by introducing a lump-sum tax/subsidy for the …rm (measured in units of the …nal good) PtT x t . In this case, the optimal tax is
and t = 0 8t: The sign of this instrument also depends on the relation between and v. Note that when v = 0;
the social planner introduces an entry subsidy to increase the productivity of the economy. In this case, t can be interpreted as a subsidy to R&D of new varieties. If the government does not have access to lump-sum taxes, it needs to take into account these two market failures in the design of the optimal tax policy.
Optimal taxation
In this section, we characterize the optimal …scal policy or constrained optimum. In order to solve the government problem, we use the primal approach of optimal taxation proposed by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) . This approach is based on characterizing the set of allocations that the government can implement for a given …scal policy. The market equilibrium or set of implementable allocations is described by the period resource constraints, the equilibrium entry condition and the so-called implementability constraint. The implementability constraint is the household's present value budget constraint after the substitution of the …rst-order conditions of the consumer's and …rms'problems. This constraint captures the e¤ect that changes in the tax policy have on agents decisions and market prices. Thus, the government problem is to maximize its objective function over the set of implementable allocations. This is called the Ramsey allocation problem. We present the tax policy as "optimal wedges"rather than a particular tax system. We can implement optimal allocations as a market equilibrium with distortionary taxes.
In the Appendix, we present the derivation of the implementability constraint and, following Chari and Kehoe (1999) , we show that an implementable allocation can be supported as a market equilibrium with taxes.
It is well-known that the government has an incentive to heavily tax the initial wealth of the consumer. This policy amounts to a nondistortionary lump-sum tax. As a result, the Lagrange multiplier of the implementability constraint would be zero. Given that we already have characterized the unconstrained optimum, we assume that the initial capital income tax k 0 is taken as given. In our framework, the optimal tax policy depends on the government's ability to di¤erentiate tax allowances and, hence, to control entry. We consider three di¤erent cases:
E¤ective control on entry-decisions: the government has a complete set of …scal instruments and can directly control entry. This formulation is equivalent to a tax code with di¤erent tax allowances for …xed and variable cost, or a tax code where …xed cost cannot be expensed, i.e., vp 6 = s and the government can introduce a pro…ts tax :
Ine¤ective control on entry-decisions: the government cannot directly choose the number of …rms. The tax code does not distinguish between variable and …xed costs and, thus, it is restricted to use the same tax rate, i.e., vp = s and the pro…ts tax is not available
In the third case, suggested by Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) , we assume that the government has to apply the same marginal tax to both capital income and pro…ts. In this case, the government can indirectly control entry through a corporate tax.
E¤ective control on entry-decisions
Next, we de…ne the government problem for the case where entry-exit decisions are controlled by the government. This formulation is consistent with a pro…ts tax that di¤erentiates tax allowances between …xed and variable costs, or a tax code where …xed costs cannot be expensed, i.e. t 6 = 0. Thus, the tax authority uses the pro…ts tax to control the number of …rms (aggregate level of productivity) in the intermediate goods sector. The government will set a subsidy in case of an insu¢ cient entry or a tax in case of an excessive entry. This case is used as a benchmark to compare the results with those arising from a limited set of tax instruments.
De…nition 2 (Ramsey allocation problem): Given the government expenditure fG t g 1 t=0 , and the initial conditions f k 0 ; K 0 ; D 0 g; the allocations associated to the optimal …scal policy f t ; l t ; k t+1 g 1 t=0 are derived by solving
where c t 0 and L t 2 [0; 1]:
Let and t be the Lagrange multiplier of the implementability constraint and the resource constraint, respectively. The …rst-order conditions of the government problem with respect to fc t ; L t ; K t+1 ; z t g are 17
1 7 Throughout the paper we assume that the solution of the Ramsey allocation problem exists and converges to a unique steady state. Neither of these assumptions are innocuous. The su¢ cient conditions for an optimum involve third derivatives of the utility function. Therefore, the solution might not represent a maximum, or the system might not have a solution because it does not exist a feasible policy that satis…es the intertemporal government budget constraint. However, if the solution to the government problem exists and is interior, it satis…es the above …rst-order conditions. Hence, the optimal …scal analysis applies only to these cases.
together with a transversality condition for the capital, the period resource constraint and the implementability constraint. Note that the Lagrange multiplier measures the e¤ect of the distortionary taxes on the utility function, i.e., the burden of taxation or the social cost of tax revenue. In particular, it can be interpreted as the amount that the households would be willing to pay in order to replace one unit of distortionary tax revenue by one unit of lump-sum revenue, measured in terms of the consumption good at time zero.
Comparing Eq. (33) with Eq. (13), we obtain the optimal pro…ts tax
Note that from now onwards, we use a hat to denote optimality. When the government can control entry-decisions, it implements a tax/subsidy in the intermediate goods production which is identical to the social planner tax/subsidy, Eq.(28). As we have seen in Section 3, as long as v >
; the tax authority subsidizes entry because of the positive e¤ect of the returns to specialization.
However, when v < ; it is optimal to tax pro…ts, since the social cost of introducing a new …rm o¤sets the productivity gain. Since private …rms do not internalize this e¤ect, the tax authority has to reduce market entry. Therefore, the government optimally sets the number of …rms by taking into account only the productivity gains associated with the introduction of a new variety, regardless of the social cost of tax revenue. This result could be considered as an application of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) principle of aggregate production e¢ ciency 18 .
The …scal system should allow the economy to be on the production frontier and then individual decisions among the possible combinations in the frontier are distorted. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) show that if the government has a complete set of tax instruments, so that a 100% tax can be levied on pure pro…ts, the tax system should not distort the allocation of intermediate inputs. However, as we will see, if the government does not have enough tax instruments to control entry or to remove the mark-up distortion, this result does not apply and the government cannot implement the social planner tax/subsidy on entry.
It is straightforward to …nd the long-run optimal capital income tax. From the …rst-order conditions of the government problem, Eq.(30) and Eq.(32), evaluated in steady state we have
Comparing this condition with Eq.(22) evaluated in steady state, we obtain the optimal capital income tax , b k = = (1 ) ; which is the subsidy proposed by Judd (1997 Judd ( , 2002 to remove the mark-up distortion on capital accumulation 19 . As we have seen in the social planner problem, we need to introduce a capital subsidy to eliminate the wedge between the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and transformation. The following proposition summarizes all these …ndings.
Proposition 1: When the government can control entry-decisions:
1) The optimal steady-state capital income tax is negative and it coincides with the social planner subsidy, as in Judd (1997 Judd ( , 2002 . Therefore, it does not depend on the returns to specialization.
2) The optimal pro…ts tax/subsidy coincides with the social planner tax/subsidy. Therefore, it is always constant and its sign depends on the relationship between the mark-up and the returns to specialization.
The optimal capital income tax in steady state is negative regardless of the relative magnitude of the returns to specialization with respect to the mark-up. The government faces a trade-o¤ between the business-stealing e¤ect and the complementary e¤ect, i.e., the …xed cost that society pays for the introduction of a new …rm and the productivity gains associated to the introduction of this new variety. Since the government can control the entry of …rms without distorting any individual or …rm decision, the degree of returns to specialization does not have any impact on the capital income tax 20 . Note that both the optimal pro…ts tax and the optimal capital subsidy coincide with the social planner's solution. This implies that when the government decides to subsidize/tax R&D, it ignores the social cost of the labor tax. Besides, the magnitude of the capital subsidy does not depend on the labor tax distortion. Again, the conventional formulation,
; is an interesting case, since the optimal pro…ts tax is equal to the capital subsidy b = b k = =(1 ) < 0: This result will later help us to understand the corporate tax.
Except for the endogenous entry of …rms, the …rst-order conditions for the government problem in the economy with imperfectly competitive markets are similar to the conditions for an economy with competitive markets. As a consequence, we can extend some of the results of the uniform commodity tax literature to the transition path (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980 ). An 1 9 Judd (1997) obtains this capital tax in the case of a 100% pro…ts tax. He also presents the case of a …xed pro…ts tax. In this case, the capital subsidy depends on the pro…ts tax and the social cost of taxation. The reason is that in his model pro…ts are a "pure rent", hence, a pro…ts tax becomes a lump-sum tax, which helps to reduce the social cost of taxation.
2 0 In fact, it is not so important that the government can di¤erentiate tax allowances between …xed and variable costs, since the Ramsey allocation can be implemented in several ways. For instance, the intermediate goods sector can be directly controled by the government through a tax x t on intermediate production x: In this case, the steady-state optimal …scal policy implies
In fact, the government uses the tax on the intermediate output to e¢ ciently set the number of varieties, and after it uses the capital income tax to e¢ ciently set the capital-labor ratio by correcting the distortion due to the tax on output, so that
inspection of the …rst-order conditions gives some insight about the requirements that the utility function needs to satisfy in order to have constant taxes from t > 1: The proof is in the Appendix.
Corollary 1: For the class of utility functions that are additively separable (across time and goods) and homothetic with respect to consumption and hours worked, the optimal policy from t > 1 prescribes constant taxes.
An example of utility function that satis…es this property is
Ine¤ective control on entry-decisions
The previous results critically hinge on the assumption that the government has a separate instrument to control entry. To illustrate this point, we consider the case where the government sets equal tax allowances for …xed and variable costs. Therefore, the equilibrium number of …rms or varieties cannot be a¤ected by the …scal authority and production e¢ ciency is not longer attainable. Thus, t = 0 and z t is treated by the government as a variable beyond its direct control. However, the government knows that it can a¤ect the number of …rms by changing capital accumulation, but it has to bear a utility cost associated to the change in the consumption and leisure paths.
Since t = 0; the zero pro…t condition without taxes becomes a constraint for an allocation to be implementable. Combining the free-entry condition Eq.(13) with the resource constraint, Eq.(20), gives
Let and t be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the implementability constraint and the new resource constraint Eq.(37), respectively. Then, the associated …rst-order conditions with respect to fc t ; L t ; K t+1 g are
Using Eq. (38) and Eq.(40) evaluated in steady state, we have
Comparing this condition with Eq. (22) evaluated in steady state, we obtain a negative capital income tax, b k = v=(1 v) < 0; that only depends on the returns to specialization. Given that v 2 [0; 1) ; the capital income tax is negative. The next proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 2: When the government cannot control entry-decisions, t = 0, then the sign of the optimal capital income tax in the steady state is negative, regardless of the magnitude of the mark-up, b k = v=(1 v) < 0 . Nevertheless, in the absence of aggregate returns to specialization, v = 0; the optimal capital income tax in the steady state is zero.
In contrast with the previous case, the optimal capital income tax does not depend on the magnitude of the mark-up. Since the government cannot control the …rms' entry, it uses the capital income tax to partially correct the e¤ects of the returns to specialization. Consequently, the magnitude of the mark-up does not have any impact on the capital income tax. To explain the intuition of this result, one particular case deserves special attention. In the absence of aggregate returns to specialization, v = 0; we should not subsidize capital to eliminate the mark-up distortion, b k = 0. In this case, the introduction of a new …rm only has a negative consequence: a business-stealing e¤ect that translates into a social waste of resources by means of the …xed cost. As a result, the marginal rate of transformation between present and future consumption is equal to 1
This means that the return of a unit investment in terms of future consumption is the marginal productivity of capital F K ; minus the resources wasted by the …xed cost of new …rms, F K . The accumulation of capital raises pro…ts by F K ;
which is used by new …rms entering the market to pay the …xed cost. Since the …xed cost is a waste of resources, the net increase in future consumption is equal to (1 )F K (K; L). By comparing Eq. (22) and Eq. (41), in the case of v = 0; we can see that the existence of the mark-up implies that the return of capital in the market coincides with the optimal return of capital from the government point of view. Therefore, the government should not subsidize capital to remove the mark-up distortion. If the government decided to implement the capital subsidy proposed by Judd (1997) , given that the number of …rms cannot be controlled, the capital subsidy would lead to an ine¢ cient number of …rms. Thus, the threat of entry makes the prescribed capital income tax to be zero instead of negative. Therefore, in order to implement the Judd (1997) capital subsidy, the government has to be able to control the number of …rms.
In the more general case, as we can see in equation Eq. (41), there is a complementary e¤ect, and, then, the entry of new …rms increases the return of investment. Since this externality is not internalized by the …rms, the government needs to introduce a capital subsidy to promote entry, b k = v=(1 v): Note that the price-marginal cost distortion is not relevant to design of optimal capital income tax, thus the government should only target the ine¢ cient entry distortion. However, since the government can only encourage entry through a capital subsidy, the production e¢ ciency condition should not be implemented, since it would lead to a large distortion in the capital stock. In particular, in the case of the conventional formulation, v = = (1 ) < 1; the optimal capital subsidy is k = =(1 2 ) < 0: Clearly, this result is a "mirage", in the sense that we cannot know if the government should target the price-marginal cost or the ine¢ cient entry distortion.
This …nding is consistent with some theoretical …ndings in the industrial organization literature. When the government cannot control the entry decisions on a market and there are no returns to specialization, a tax or a subsidy leads to a socially ine¢ cient number of …rms, since it increases the …xed costs; this is called ine¢ cient economies of scale. For instance, Auerbach and Hines (2002) show that in a static Cournot model with free entry, an output subsidy to equate the price to the marginal cost encourages ine¢ cient entry of new …rms. Our result proves to be more general because we are considering a dynamic general equilibrium analysis instead of a partial equilibrium. Finally, using the same arguments as in the Proof of Corollary 1, it is straightforward to extend the results of Proposition 2 to the transition path.
Corporate taxation.
In this section, we consider the case where the government cannot distinguish between capital income and pro…ts. Therefore, both taxes have to be the same in all periods, k t = t . We call them corporate taxes, c t . This tax implies that the government taxes at the same rate all the income generated by the …rm after paying the labor cost, and the …rm cannot deduct the …xed cost 21 . In this tax structure, suggested by Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) , the government uses the corporate tax as an indirect way to tax the economic rents or monopoly pro…ts. Judd (1997) , Guo and Lansing (1999) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) consider the optimal corporate tax in a dynamic model when the number of …rms is …xed. They show that monopoly pro…ts can yield a positive corporate tax. In our economy, the government uses the corporate tax to indirectly set the number of …rms z t . We …nd that the optimal corporate tax depends on the returns to specialization, the mark-up and the curvature degree of the production function. The assumption that the …rm cannot deduct the …xed cost could be considered unappealing from the empirical point of view, since the R&D could be considered part of the …xed cost. However, since the optimal corporate tax does not depend on the …xed cost, the …scal treatment of the …xed cost is irrelevant to determine the optimal tax. For instance, we could assume that the government allows to deduct a fraction of the …xed cost, like a R&D allowance, and the outcome would be the same. The exception occurs when there is a 100% deduction, since we obtain the tax code of the previous case.
The tax restriction takes the form of an additional constraint on the Ramsey allocation problem. In this case, by substituting the tax from Eq.(22) into the zero pro…t condition, we obtain an additional constraint needed to characterize the set of implementable allocations,
This restriction shows that, from the government's perspective, the tax distortion due to either the returns on savings or the introduction of a new …rm has to be the same. In the Appendix we show that the following steady-state condition is satis…ed:
where " = " Proposition 3: When the government cannot di¤ erentiate between capital income and pro…ts, then the sign of the optimal steady-state corporate tax is positive whenever v= < "=(1 ") and negative whenever v= > "=(1 ").
When pro…ts and capital income taxes cannot be di¤erentiated, the government faces a tradeo¤ between eliminating distortions associated to the market power and determining the e¢ cient level of entry. In general, we …nd that the optimal corporate tax can be positive, negative or zero.
It depends on the relative magnitude of the returns to specialization with respect to the mark-up and the curvature degree of the production function. If the returns to specialization relative to the mark-up are big enough, then the government lowers the corporate tax in order to promote the entry of new …rms. The curvature degree of the production function shows how the return of capital changes with the capital stock. In the absence of returns to specialization, v = 0; then the optimal corporate tax is positive, in order to prevent the excessive entry of …rms. In the conventional formulation, v = =(1 ), we obtain that the corporate tax is equal to the capital subsidy proposed by Judd (1997 Judd ( , 2002 , b c = =(1 ). As we have seen in the case when the government can control entry, capital and pro…ts tax are identical,
Then, in this case we do not have any con ‡ict between the price-marginal cost and the inef…cient entry distortion. Since we can use the corporate tax to remove the price-marginal cost distortion in capital accumulation and to achieve the optimal number of …rms, the production e¢ ciency condition applies to this case. Unfortunately, there is no a prior a reason to believe in this particular combination of parameters. Therefore, we cannot rely on a corporate subsidy to remove both distortions at the same time. We illustrate this trade-o¤ through the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Corollary 2: If the production function is F (K; L) = K u L 1 u , where u is the production elasticity with respect to the capital, then "=(1 ") = (u 1) and therefore the steady-state corporate tax is positive if v= < (1 u) :
Di¤erentiated consumption and investment goods
We analyze the robustness of the previous results by considering a formulation with di¤erentiated consumption and investment goods. In particular, we assume that the individual buys several di¤erentiated consumption goods and derives utility from the following mix:
where x ci is the consumption good produced by …rm i; and v c is the degree of returns to specialization or love of variety for the consumption mix. Investment goods, I t , are produced by competitive …rms through the following technology:
where x Ii is the intermediate good i used to produce investment goods, and v I is the degree of returns to specialization for the investment. Note that the same varieties are used to consume and to produce investment goods.
In the Appendix, we show that the social optimum implies the same taxes on labor and capital income as in the model with one …nal goods sector, but now the steady-state pro…ts tax
Since the main forces driving the economy do not change, the social planner allocation does not change either. Thus, social planner subsidies are determined only by the mark-up, k t = l t = = (1 ) : Obviously, when v c = v I we recover our previous pro…ts tax, Eq.(28).
The socially e¢ cient pro…ts tax depends on the capital depreciation and the elasticity of the production function with respect to the capital " F;K . Since there exist di¤erent degrees of returns to specialization, the social planner has to take into account steady-state investment.
However, when depreciation is zero, the optimal tax is
Note that sign (@ =@v I ) = sign (@ =@v c ) < 0; so we have the same e¤ects as when there is only one …nal goods sector.
We have the same qualitative results and e¤ects in the optimal tax policy. In particular, when the government can control entry, t 6 = 0, we obtain in steady state that the optimal pro…ts and capital income tax are equal to the socially e¢ cient values. Besides, when the government cannot control entry t = 0, the optimal capital subsidy is equal to
Again, given that the government cannot control entry, the capital subsidy should not be used to eliminate the mark-up distortion, but it should be used to encourage entry. The corporate tax, in the case of no depreciation = 0; is (the general case is in the Appendix)
Note that when v c = v I ; the tax policy coincides with the one …nal goods sector model. Hence, we can conclude that the introduction of di¤erentiated consumption and investment goods does not change the qualitative results of the paper, but it can a¤ect the optimal magnitude.
Conclusions
In recent papers, Judd (1997 Judd ( , 2002 has presented evidence in favor of a negative capital income tax. Using a representative-agent model with a …xed number of goods produced by monopolistic …rms, he …nds that the optimal …scal policy implies a negative capital income tax and a 100% tax rate on …rms'pro…ts.
The main contribution of our paper is to show that once we consider an endogenous number of …rms or varieties, the optimal …scal policy can lead to di¤erent results. We show that the optimal …scal policy is conditioned by the existence of two market failures: market power and ine¢ cient entry. In particular, the capital income tax depends on the government's ability to control entry through a tax on variable pro…ts. We follow the formulation of Ethier (1982) and Benassy (1996) to separate the mark-up from the index of returns to specialization, which measures the trade-o¤ between the …xed costs that society pays for the introduction of a new …rm and the productivity gains associated to this new …rm.
We consider three di¤erent cases. In the …rst case, we assume that the government can levy a tax on pro…ts, so that the government can control entry. The government implements a capital subsidy to remove the price-marginal cost distortion on capital accumulation, as in Judd (1997, 2002) . Besides, the optimal pro…ts tax coincides with the tax that a social planner would implement if lump-sum taxes were available. We show that both the capital subsidy and the pro…ts tax do not depend on the tax burden. One important implication of these results is that if the government has available a complete set of taxes, the subsidies to promote the entry of new …rms or R&D should not be constrained by the tax burden.
In the second case, we assume that the government cannot tax pro…ts, so the equilibrium number of …rms cannot be directly controlled by the …scal authority. With this tax code restriction, we …nd that the government should not implement a capital subsidy to remove the price-marginal cost distortion, but that the capital subsidy should be used to encourage the entry of …rms, then it does depend on the returns to specialization. In contrast with Judd (1997 Judd ( , 2002 , we show that in the absence of aggregate returns to specialization the optimal steady-state capital income tax is zero.
In the third case, suggested by Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) , the government has to apply the same marginal tax to both capital income and pro…ts. In this case the government can indirectly control entry through a corporate tax. We …nd that the optimal corporate tax depends not only on the magnitude of the returns to specialization and the mark-up, but also on the curvature degree of the production function. Also, we show that the results remain unchanged if we consider di¤erentiated consumption and investment goods.
Finally, our results highlight the idea that the optimal tax system would depend on the information available about the structure of the economy: market power, productivity of the 
Multiplying Eq.(A.2) by t and adding up from t = 0 to t = 1 yields Equivalence between an implementable and a market allocation: An allocation in the market equilibrium y = fc t ; L t ; K t+1 ; z t g 1 t=0 satis…es the set of implementable allocations. Moreover, if an allocation y is implementable, then we can construct a tax policy f t ; l t ; k t+1 g 1 t=0 and prices fr t ; p t ; w t g 1 t=0 ; such that the allocation together with prices and the policy constitute a market equilibrium.
Proof: The …rst part of the claim is always satis…ed, since any market equilibrium allocation has to satisfy the resource constraint, the zero pro…t condition and the implementability constraint. Now we prove the second part of the claim. Given an implementable allocation y, the market prices can be backed out using Eq.(8), Eq.(9) and Eq.(11). The tax policy is recovered from Eq.(13), Eq. (18) and Eq.(19). Substituting U ct and U Lt in the implementability constraint we obtain the consumer budget constraints, from where we recover the level of debt. If the resource constraint and the consumers budget constraints are satis…ed, then the government budget constraint is also satis…ed.
Proof of Corollary 1: The class of utility functions that are additively separable (across time and goods) and homothetic with respect to consumption and hours worked satisfy A.5) where D and E are di¤erent constants, and separability between consumption and hours worked implies U ctLt = U Ltct = 0: In this case, the …rst-order conditions of the government problem can be written as
where is constant. Clearly, from the market equilibrium Eq. (22) 
(A.13)
Substituting t+1 from Eq.(A.11) into Eq.(A.12), evaluating the resulting equation in steady state and dividing it by the same equation one period forward, we obtain that t = t+1 : (A.14)
Noting that " = " F K ;K =" F;K = (F KK K=F K ) = (F K K=F ) < 0 and using Eq. (13) ; j = c; I:
entry of …rms increases the return of capital r=P I and the purchasing power of wages w=P c ,
The free-entry condition indicates that the number of …rms depends on v I ; since the …xed cost is de…ned in terms of the investment good,
The individual budget constraint is For the tax policy, the implementability constraint is
Repeating the same process of the paper, we obtain Eq(48) and the following corporate tax: In the case = 0; we obtain Eq.(49).
